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CHOICE, CHANCE, AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN
STRATEGIC CHANGE: A PROCESS UNDERSTANDING OF THE





Strategic change is frequently viewed as emanating from the purposeful choices of
organizational actors intent on achieving a prespecifíed goal against a backdrop of
existing environmental forces. Conversely, population ecology advocates maintain that
change is a consequence of species populations heing subjected to environmental
selection. Either way, change is deemed epiphenomenal to social entities (i.e., actors,
organizations, environments, etc.); change processes involve the doings of/to things.
This reflects an "owned" view of change processes. We present a detailed empirical
study of an automotive company's efforts to adapt to "relentless" change. We argue
that an "unowned" view of process that elevates chance, environmental uncertainty,
and the unintended consequences of choice in accounting for strategic change is a more
processual way of understanding the eventual demise of NorthCo Automotive.
While Napoleon thought he was in control of events,
the Russian general Kutuzov knew that neither of
them were, and so made fewer mistakes.
-Tolstoy (1869/1993, War and Peace]
A distinctive feature of much of cvyrent theoriz-
ing about processes of strategic change is the cen-
tral role assigned to human agency, choice, and
deliberate intention in explaining the conduct of
organizations and management (Child, 1972, 1997;
Peng, 2003; Whittington, 1988). Successful out-
comes are celebrated and causally linked to the
timely and decisive interventions of identifiable
individuals in crucially shaping the course of
events and in bringing about a desired state of
affairs (Burgelman & Grove, 2007; Child & Smith,
1987; Denis, Lamothe, & Langley, 2001; Pettigrew,
1987, 1992; Siggelkow, 2001, 2002; Van de Ven,
1992). Conversely, failure is attributed to a lack of
foresight and effective action on the part of incum-
bent leaders (Barnett & Burgelman, 1996; Christen-
son & Bower, 1996; Finkelstein, 2003; Wiesenfeld,
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Wurthmann, & Hambrick, 2008). In this way,
agency is assigned a privileged, heroic status; it is
the deliberate doings of individuals that determine
the success and/or failure of organizations. This
tendency to overvalorize agency is linked to
a widespread propensity to make sense of the
world of business practice ex post facto in terms
of a representationalist epistemology (Chia, 1996;
Rorty, 1980) whereby both the origin of a cause and
its effect are assumed to be straightforwardly locat-
able and assignable in space and time (cf. White-
head, 1926/1985: 61-65). As a consequence, the
messy, equivocal, and mutually causal nature of
organizational situations is systematically reduced
to key decisions, actions, events, and states that
provide convenient conceptual "resting points" for
theoretical causal explanations. One major conse-
quence of this analytical predisposition is that
social entities (i.e., actors, organizaüons, environ-
ments) are ontologically privileged over amorphous,
disparate, and impersonal processes. Methodological
individualism, which atfributes outcomes (successful
or otherwise) to the deliberate intenfions, conscious
choices, and purposeful acfions of individuals, pre-
vails (Chia & Holt, 2009; Chia & MacKay, 2007; In-
gold, 2000).
A converse of this overemphasis on agency and
strategic choice is the environmental determinism
postulated by population ecology models in organ-
ization theory that emphasize the primacy of natu-
ral selection in determining organizational survival
and growth. Here it is assumed that the fortunes of
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organizations are based on the fit or otherwise be-
tween certain identifiable attributes of a firm and
preexisting environmental forces. Such perspec-
tives do not deny that managers can exercise
choices over their organizations' futures but do sug-
gest that, when managers confront change imposed
by exogenous processes in ambiguous and uncer-
tain environments, agency and choice are con-
strained to the point at which all they can do is to
either learn and adapt passively to their external
environment in a bid to survive, or suffer the con-
sequences of natural selection (e.g., Aldrich, 1979:
2000; Aldrich, Hodgson, Hull, Knudsen, Mokyr, &
Vanberg, 2008; Baum & Singh, 1994; Baum &
McKelvey, 1999; Baum & Rao, 2004; Betton & Dess,
1985; Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984, 1989; Han-
nan, Polos, & Carroll, 2003a, 2003b; Levinthal,
1991, 1997; Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991;
McKelvey & Aldrich, 1983; Péli, 2008; Siggelkow &
Levinthal, 2003).
Although some scholars do point out that pro-
cesses of change often reflect aspects of both
managerial choice (in the form of adaptation) and
environmental determinism (in the form of popu-
lation-level selection), with discordance between
positions primarily pertaining to which has pri-
macy in driving change (Astley & Van de Ven,
1983; Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985; Van de Ven & Poole,
1995), we argue that both these approaches presup-
pose the causal efficacy of social entities (i.e., or-
ganizational actors, external environment, etc.) in
determining outcomes. There is little room for the-
orizing the unexpected effects of organizational-
environmental interactions and the unintended
consequences of deliberate choices that inadver-
tently contribute to shaping future organizational
circumstances. Both approaches discount the fact
that the in situ responses of agents themselves,
rather than preexisting external environmental
conditions, can generate unanticipated conse-
quences that eventually end up facilitating or
thwarting organizational aspirations. Such unantic-
ipated consequences are a direct result of what
Merton called the "imperious immediacy of inter-
est" (1936: 901), by which he meant that choices
made in dealing with perceived immediate con-
cerns can create longer-term ramifications. So, un-
intended outcomes and states of affairs may arise,
not from sheer environmental forces, but from the
interaction of deliberate choices made by organiza-
tional actors with chance environmental circum-
stances. It was thus the organization's very act of
choosing a particular course of action that gener-
ated the unintended consequences it subse-
quently faced.
Such a modest view of human agency challenges
people's sense of invulnerability and questions the
potency of organizational actors in their ability to
control their own destinies. On the other hand, the
population ecology perspective, as we have inti-
mated, largely discounts the capacity for human
ingenuity in creatively fashioning responses and
reconfiguring priorities to perceived environmental
pressures. Conceptualizing human agency as cre-
atively adaptive, though not always successfully
so, because of the possibility of unintended conse-
quences arising from deliberate choices, is patently
consistent with a processual view of reality. From
this moderated worldview, organizational life is
better characterized, not by deterministic natural
selection, nor by strategic choice, but by an inter-
active process oí creative evolution (Bergson, 1911/
1998); choice, chance, and environmental circum-
stances interact to produce both positive and
negative unintended consequences that influence
organizational outcomes in the most unexpected of
ways. This moderating of strategic choice and en-
vironmental selection is central to a newfound ap-
preciation of the primacy of process in organiza-
tional theorizing.
In this article, we present a five-year longitudinal
study of the top management team (TMT) at
NorthCo Automotive (a pseudonym), a Canadian
automotive company, amidst significant and unex-
pected global changes as they unfolded over time.
The initial premise of the study was that managers
are able to shape their organizational destinies by
taking purposeful action to adapt to, or even enact,
changing environmental circumstances. The focus
of the study itself began to shift as the novelty
inherent in processes of emergence overwhelmed
iterations of NorthCo's strategic plan throughout
the five-year duration of the study. We found that
repeated attempts by the TMT to keep pace with
punishing change resulted in the unintended con-
sequence of taking decisions that, although emi-
nently efficacious in resolving the immediate prob-
lems faced, nevertheless sowed the seeds for their
own eventual demise. The firm eventually suc-
cumbed to "black swans" (Taleb, 2007)—unex-
pected happenings that have disproportionate re-
percussions over time—after having successfully
traded for four decades in a highly competitive
environment. This event led us to attempt to ana-
lyze oiu: data using concepts of adaptation (e.g.,
Barnett, 1997; Levinthal, 1991, 1997; Levinthal &
Posen, 2007; March, 1991) and selection (e.g.,
Aldrich, 1979, 2000; Baum & Singh, 1994; Hannan
& Freeman, 1977, 1984; McKelvey & Aldrich,
1983). Such perspectives gave some limited insight
into some of the reasons for the failure of the or-
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ganization being studied, but their focus on envi-
ronmental properties and stable organizational
traits couldn't account fully for the rich particular-
ities, the twists and turns of the evolving organiza-
tional situation that we were documenting. Such
explanations from adaptation (e.g., learning mod-
els, routines, search strategies) and selection (e.g.,
age, size, niche, performance, resource depen-
dence, structural inertia) "seem to us insufficient"
(Bergson, 1911/1998: 55) because environmental
circumstances are "not a (static) mould into which
life is inserted" (Bergson, 1911/1998: 58). They do
not take into account the possibility of the
organism/organization autopoietically fashioning
a reply instead of merely taking adaptive actions
(Maturana & Várela, 1980). We came to the con-
clusion that to understand the eventual failure of
NorthCo, a radical reversal of the ontological pri-
orities underpinning process theories of change
in organization and management was required;
one that acknowledges the reality of "unowned"
change processes in which social entities are
"constituted out of the flow of process and sub-
stantiality is subordinated to activity" (Rescher,
1996: 42-43; also see Bergson, 1911/1998, 1946/
1992; James, 1911/1996; Mead, 2002; Whitehead,
1926/1985).
Our argument is that too much of what simply
happens in process studies of strategic change is
credited either to the deliberate actions and inten-
tions of managerial agents or to the causal influence
of external environmental pressures. Our objective
is to demonstrate that intended actions interacting
with chance environmental circumstances can re-
sult in changes that produce unintended conse-
quences that, in turn, can be decisive in shaping the
fortunes of an organization. This possibility is
hardly ever acknowledged in retrospective expla-
nations of strategic change. Our contributions are
(a) advancing a philosophically informed perspec-
tive on process studies of strategic change in organ-
ization; (b) moderating explanations that give pri-
macy to either managerial choice or environmental
determinism by elevating the interactive role of
choice, chance, change, and unintended conse-
quences in shaping strategic outcomes; and, (c) re-
framing the debate between managerial choice and
environmental determinism in terms that reflect a
processual orientation as distinct from variance ap-
proaches that emphasize covariations between de-
pendent and independent variables.
We begin by arguing that process studies of
change in organization and management can bene-
fit immeasurably by recognizing a vital distinction
made by process philosophers between "owned"
and "unowned" processes. "Owned" process per-
spectives emphasize essential stabilities and give
precedence to things as causal agents in their ana-
lytical explanandums. Events are attributed to
identifiable choices made and/or environmental
imperatives, and tight, linear, cause-effect relation-
ships are presinned. Chance, nonlinearity, and the
unintended consequences of actions (that is, con-
sequences not intended by managers coping with a
chaotic and messy reality) are subjugated. Yet
rarely do strategic change processes, we argue, flow
in straight lines. An "imowned" perspective ac-
cepts many of the insights of both strategic choice
and population ecology perspectives but reverses
their ontological priorities and reorients attention
toward the destabilizing djoiamic interactions
among rapidly emerging, frequently unintentional,
and often surprising multicausal process com-
plexes. Following a note on our research methods,
we illustrate our case through an "vmowned" pro-
cessual analysis of the unfolding situation faced by
NorthCo Automotive that shows how unexpected
chance events and unintended consequences of
purposeful choices and actions conspired to over-
whelm it, forcing it eventually into liquidation.
We then outline our conclusions and implications
for understanding strategic change and give some
suggestions for further research in the process
tradition.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
An "Unowned" View of Processes of Strategic
Change
There is a growing awareness that theories of
strategic change need to include more attention to
process as a nonlinear, continuous phenomenon
characterized by chaotic dynamics (Brown & Eisen-
hardt, 1997; Denis et al., 2001; Eisenhardt, 2000;
Garud & Van de Ven, 2002; Pettigrew, Woodman, &
Cameron, 2001; Tsoukas, 2005, 2010). Eisenhardt
(2000), for instance, observed that theories of
"punctuated equilibrium" (e.g., Romanelli & Tush-
man, 1994; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) that con-
ceptualize change in terms of the transition be-
tween one frozen state to another, and linear
evolutionary models of variation-selection-reten-
tion (e.g., Aldrich, 1979: 2000; Hannan & Freeman,
1979, 1984), are less valid in a constantly fluxing
world. Scholars have argued that when processes of
continuous change and emergence are not ac-
counted for, such concepts become unproductive
in nonlinear settings (Meyer, Gaba, & Colwell,
2005: 457). Despite such heightened appreciation
of the importance of theorizing continuous change,
it is still construed as either something that hap-
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pens to otherwise stable social entities such as or-
ganizations or as something controlled by organi-
zational actors and/or environments. This owned
perspective on process leads to the privileging of
agency, choice, and/or environmental forces over
chance, happenstance, and unintended conse-
quences. Because of this owned process orienta-
tion, ambiguities remain about how strategic
choices interact with environmental pressures and
chance circumstances to shape the emergence and
development of an organizational situation. This is
particularly the case when the interaction of pro-
cesses results in complexes of unstable nonlinear '
dynamics rather than the relative stability often
presupposed in traditional research (Garud & Van
de Ven, 2002). It is this acute awareness of the
current inadequacy of process research in organi-
zation studies that has prompted recent pressing
questions about "how and why things emerge, de-
velop, grow, or terminate over time" (Langley,
Smallman, Tsoukas, & Van de Ven, 2009:1). Adopt-
ing the useful distinction made by process philos-
ophers between owned and unowned process the-
ories (e.g., Rescher, 1996: 42), we argue, helps to
address such questions. Owned process theories
construe processes as the "doings" of/to otherwise
stable social entities; they are owned processes be-
cause they're represented as a priori causal deter-
minants of outcomes. Unowned process theories,
on the other hand, construe actors, organizations,
and environments not as the underlying driving
forces of change, but as themselves temporary and
precariously configured casual effects of self-sus-
taining unowned process complexes. Change can
happen "of its own volition" without need for an
identifiable agent of change (Bergson, 1946/1992:
147-148). While owned theories of process view
change as periodic transitions between otherwise
stable states, unowned theories of process view
change as pervasive, continuous, and relentless.
The essence of an unowned process analysis is
not the certitude of identifiable agents, definable
strategies, key events, or stable states but the irre-
ducible equivocality actors face in their everyday
coping actions—for every action taken in real time
is taken in response to a perceived uncertainty (von
Mises, 1949: 105). This, in turn, implies a necessar-
ily incomplete or partial understanding of the sit-
uation faced and hence the possibility of unin-
tended consequences arising from such coping
actions. In order to undertake a serious process
analysis of strategic change, uncertainty and hence
a sense of a multiplicity of possible outcomes—of
otherness—must be a constant shadowy presence
in the narrative accounting of organizational situa-
tions. Under such circumstances, the choices man-
agers make at a particular point in time may seem
expedient and appropriate, but may nevertheless
create the very circumstances for their own down-
fall as situations unfold and the organization finds
itself trapped in its own previous strategic
commitments.
An unowned theory of process and emergence,
therefore, eschews attributing success or failure
solely to either the heroism or incompetence of
leaders or, alternatively, to the munificence or per-
niciousness of their environment in favor of cred-
iting eventualities to the unexpected turns of cir-
cumstances that influence the fortune and survival
of an organization. Such a view does not negate the
notion that managers, as conscious agents, can act
purposively, but it acknowledges that every choice
made and every deliberate action taken are neces-
sarily partial; decisions and actions are ultimately
arbitrary acts of "incision" made into the "flow of
reality that simultaneously includes and excludes
for attention" (Whitehead, 1929: 58; see also Chia,
1994; Spencer-Brown, 1969). Potentially, therefore,
what is excluded from immediate attention because
of the "imperious immediacy of interest" (Merton,
1936: 901) can always return as the source of un-
intended consequences in the future as circum-
stances unfold. From this understanding, the po-
tency of agency is thus necessarily compromised as
an inevitable feature of social existence. Success or
failure, stu'vival or demise cannot be wholly attrib-
utable to the deliberate choices that leaders make or
to preexisting environmental forces. Rather,
chance, happenstance, and luck have much to do in
shaping organizational destinies. This argument
suggests that in any set of circumstances latent
possibilities are always present, but that these pos-
sibilities may never be realized simply because
they were never noticed or because of the choices
not taken.
Actors make decisions and take actions, but ev-
ery choice made and action taken contain the seeds
of both latent possibilities and unintended conse-
quences that remain as potentialities at a specific
moment in time; "ignorance and knowledge coex-
ist" (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005: 412). An
unowned view of process leads to a redistribution
of attention to "the far and the scattered alike"
(James, 1909/1996: 251) so that seemingly remote,
peripheral, or chance events are made to feature
more prominently in explaining the outcomes of
strategic change initiatives. From an unowned pro-
cess perspective, organizational situations may
emerge from unplanned "interactions between the
consequences of choices made by various, some-
times unrelated, actors" (De Rond & Thietart, 2007:
546). These may have wide-ranging repercussions
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for an organization. These events are what is meant
by black swans: events that are perceptual outliers,
but that may have an extreme impact if/when they
occiir. Cultivating sensitivity toward the role of
black swans in processes of strategic change re-
flects awareness that sudden shifts, whether 'from
product innovation or from discontinuities in sup-
ply, demand, or competitive dynamics, regardless
of how subtle, can result in tightly integrated strat-
egies unexpectedly falling apart. Moreover, as Star-
buck argued, a "random event does not merely
affect a single period; it becomes part of the foun-
dation for future periods [and its consequences]
may accumulate over time until they dominate the
behavior of a causal process" (1994: 212 [quoted in
De Rond and Thietart, 2007: 545]).
An unowned processual approach resonates with
chaos/complexity theories in recognizing that a
manifold of small changes can have cascading and
disproportionate consequences as the full force of
their aggregation is realized. Small adjustments—
whether they are endogenous, such as managerial
decisions on financing or on whether to enter or
exit a market segment, or exogenous, such as a
change in a competitor's strategy or fluctuation in
currency exchange rates—can cause unexpectedly
large outcomes (Burgelman, 1991, 1996, 2002;
Burgelman & Grove, 2007; Dooley & Van de Ven,
1999; Levy, 1994; Lorenz, 1963; Plowman, Baker,
Beck, Kulkarni, Solansky, & Travis, 2007; Thietart
& Forgues, 1995). Yet, an unowned processual ap-
proach differs from chaos/complexity theories in
its reluctance to accept entities and stabilities as
the underlying causal basis of a complex reality
(e.g., McKelvey, 1997, 1999, 2001).
In summary, several tenets of an unowned pro-
cessual orientation to strategic change can be iden-
tified. First, change is accorded primacy over social
entities; stable states are themselves viewed as
causal "effects" of unowned fluxing processes. Sec-
ond, every decision made and every action taken
are necessarily partial and hence bring with them
the possibility of unintended consequences occur-
ring in the longer-term futinre. Multifarious and
pluralistic unowned change processes interact
with the strategic choices of managers or with
environmental forces to play a significant role in
shaping organizational realities. Third, there are
latent possibilities with every small change, for
such changes can have profound, wide-ranging
effects in the longer term. Fourth, there is no
predetermined underlying stable order in the of-
ten complex, confusing, and uncertain organiza-
tion-environment nexus. Order can emerge spon-
taneously and evaporate just as quickly, often
with dire consequences. In what follows, we il-
lustrate our argument empirically.
RESEARCH METHODS
In the following section, data from an in-depth,
inductive study (e.g., Siggelkow, 2001, 2007; Yin,
1994) into the processes of strategic change and
management at NorthCo are presented for an un-
owned process analysis. Our study demonstrates
that to understand authentically the dynamics of
organizational life as temporary and precarious ac-
complishments, researchers need to elevate un-
owned processes over causal entities in contempo-
rary organizational theorizing.
Data Sources
Primary soinrces were 30 real-time interviews
tracking the TMT of the automotive company over
five years, and two months of situated study, which
included informal conversations with plant manag-
ers, designers, and engineers and four nonpartici-
pant observations of annual strategic planning
meetings. Interviews were semistructured, lasted
between one and two hours, and were digitally
recorded and transcribed. Members of the TMT
were interviewed repeatedly over the five years. In
addition, informal contact was maintained between
formal interviews via e-mail and telephone. Partic-
ipants included the CEO, president, and VP fi-
nance, two successive VPs operations, and the VP
himian resources, VP marketing, and VP Sales. Re-
cording of strategic planning meetings was not per-
mitted. Instead, direct observation relied on exten-
sive note taking, and to ensure their reliability,
discussion of observations with TMT members din--
ing individual interviews. Secondary sources in-
cluded internal documents and trade reports. In
addition, we collected media reports and news ar-
ticles on changes in NorthCo's external environ-
ment using Factiva, a full-text media database that
allows for detailed searches.
Data Analysis
Data analysis took place between January and
May 2010. We followed guidelines set out for "nat-
uralistic inquiry" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) and we
used both first- and second-order analysis (cf. Ba-
logun & Johnson, 2004). In the first-order analysis,
we wrote a case history (Eisenhardt, 1989; Langley,
1999; Yin, 1994) that created "thick description"
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985) of the managerial choices
and emergent processes of strategic change at
NorthCo. In the second-order analysis, w^ e identi-
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fied specific choices, chance events, unowned pro-
cesses, and unintended consequences at various
levels of organizational, industry, and macro socio-
economic circumstances. We define choices as de-
cisions taken, however partial, by members of the
TMT. Chance events are black swan happenings,
unanticipated by NorthCo's Executive. Unowned
processes are those processes at organizational and
environmental levels that, once in motion, were
beyond anyone's control. Unintended conse-
quences refer to outcomes of choices taken that are
neither expected nor intended. Process complexes
are confluences of processes interacting dynamically
and underpirming sfrategic change at NorthCo. We
traced the choices through time, pajdng special atten-
tion to both their intended and unintended conse-
quences. In this phase of the analysis, we adopted an
iterative method of constant comparison (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967; Sfrauss & Corbin, 1990), moving be-
tween data and the processual tenets identified above
from the process philosophy literature (e.g., Bergson,
1946/1992; James, 1911/1996; Mead, 2002; Rescher,
1996; Whitehead, 1926/1985) to make connections
between concepts and the "complex feedback con-
nections between them" (Garud & Van de Ven, 2002:
225). During this phase of the analysis we endeavored
to focus on the processes themselves and their com-
plex emergence. Although conscious of the usual
limitations of qualitative, single-context research
(including the influence of our own predisposi-
tions in "attending to" certain phenomenological
aspects of the circumstances reported here), we
chose an inductive, single-case-study methodology
to gain insight into the processual nature of strate-
gic change, thus making the trade-off with concerns
for external validity (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lovas &
Ghoshal, 2000; Yin, 1994) in favor of demonstrated
empirical richness, explanatory power, and inter-
nal consistency (Van de Ven, 1992).
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF NORTHCO
NorthCo Automotive was established in 1968 in
Canada to manufacture trailer hitches and towing
accessories. In 1976 a young entrepreneur bought
the company and over the next 14 years expanded
and diversified the product lines into new automo-
tive accessories for consumers wishing to custom-
ize their vehicles' appearance and utility. Between
1990 and 1999, the innovative product designs be-
ing produced by NorthCo caught the attention of
several of the industry's major original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs), including Chrysler, Ford,
General Motors, and Toyota. NorthCo rapidly be-
came a tier one supplier for automotive OEMs in-
cluding Chrysler, Daimler, Ford, General Motors
(GM), Honda, Hyundai, Mitsubishi, Nissan,
Subaru, and Toyota with operations in Canada and
the United States. To meet demand from the OEMs,
the company split into a division for producing
exterior automotive accessories for OEM customers
and a second division for manufacturing trailer
hitches and towing accessories in the aftermarket
channel. This division was sold in 2001.
Between 2000 and 2004, NorthCo diversified its
business, developing painted plastics and coating
capabilities, and began building global strategic
supply partnerships in Asia by establishing a pres-
ence in the Shanghai area of China. Throughout
this period, NorthCo won Toyota gold awards for
quality and reliability, in 2001 and 2002; the
Toyota platinum award, in 2003; Toyota's Supplier
of the year award in 2004; and seven other awards
for quality and reliability, from Chrysler, Honda,
Subaru, and Toyota, between 2005 and 2008. It is in
this context that NorthCo prospered and, at the
commencement of this study in 2004, had just sur-
passed $100 million in sales. The TMT members
turned their attention to formalizing their strategic
planning processes, and this coincided with the
beginning of the study. By this time the TMT had
expanded to 12 members, and a president, who had
run the trailer hitch division in the 1990s, had been
brought back to Canada from Detroit to take over
running the company, thus freeing up the CEO to
focus on strategy formation, strategic change pro-
cesses, and board-related issues.
CHOICE, CHANCE, AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES AT NORTHCO: THE EFFECT
OF UNOWNED PROCESSES OF CHANGE
Choices about Market Positioning Strategy
Throughout 2004 and 2005, the TMT at NorthCo
went through a formal process of analyzing and
debating different market positioning strategy
choices. Analysis suggested that there were five
market segments for automotive accessories. They
ranged from segment one, which was aftermarket
sales to dealers and retailers, to segment five,
which was high-volume production for OEM as-
sembly. Segments two, three, and four were all
low-, medium-, and higher-medium-volume manu-
facturing, usually for uplift programs that took
place in facilities located next to OEM assembly
plants. Although the vice presidents for operations
and marketing argued that they should be entering
segment five, the CEO, president, and VP finance
preferred segment four because they were con-
cerned over whether there was the capacity to
achieve large enough economies of scale to be prof-
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itable and whether this commoditized, low-margin
segment would fit well with their perceived core
competencies in design and engineering. In addi-
tion, the competitors in segment five were very
large, vertically integrated players: "So there we
were; segment four was our sweet spot—low to
medium volume" (VP operations).
Choices about Manufacturing
NorthCo also faced the choice of whether to
vertically integrate onshore to retain proprietor-
ship over their manufacturing processes and in-
tellectual property, or to develop a "virtual
model" involving the "off-shoring" and outsourc-
ing of their manufacturing processes. In the mid
1990s, the CEO had visited automotive plants in
China, concluding that they did not have the
manufacturing processes to ensure reliability and
quality in their products. A trip to China in 2003,
however, led the CEO to change his view. Verti-
cally integrating was a high-cost option in a com-
moditized and hypercompetitive industry, so
they made the choice to begin outsourcing and
off-shoring their manufacturing where doing so
could give them a cost leadership competitive
advantage over their rivals, giving NorthCo flex-
ibility. As the president commented, "The virtual
model allows us to fit things together." Their
logic was that as their products matured over
time, they'd have an ability to "move down the
cost curve" relative to onshore, vertically inte-
grated competitors in North America: "That's
where our virtual model works" (VP marketing).
A team was dispatched to China in 2004 to estab-
lish partners for off-shoring and outsourcing
NorthCo's manufacturing in the Shanghai region.
By the end of 2005, however, disagreements be-
tween the VP operations and the rest of the TMT
over their segment four strategic focus was having a
negative impact on the performance of NorthCo's
operations. In transitioning to a new North Ameri-
can supplier for their step-tube manufacturing, the
company suffered quality and reliability failiures
that disrupted its supply chain and created delays
shipping products to OEM customers, prompting
the VP operations to leave the company. But as
fortune would have it, NorthCo's new Chinese out-
sourcing partners performed to a much higher stan-
dard than had been expected and allowed greater
cost savings than had been forecasted. These inter-
nal djoiamics were permeated by increasing vola-
tility in segment four, where NorthCo focused on a
level of production in-between aftermarket and
high-voliime production. As such, this segment be-
came less attractive. Intense rivalry at the industry
level and constant pressure on the supply base
from OEMs were creating ñux and unpredictable
revenue streams. The net result was unexpected
financial losses in 2005.
Changes in the Industry Environment Lead to
New Choices at NorthCo
By early 2006, a combination of industry and
macroeconomic flux and surprise losses in 2005
prompted a change in strategic emphasis to try to
adapt to the evolving market situation. The CEO
and the president now felt that segment four was
not such a great place to innovate because most
innovations were being generated in the segment
one, dealer-install aftermarket. The TMT chose to
change their focus to be on products rather than
market segments, taking a range of products such as
grill guards, running boards, step-tubes, and
painted plastic ground effects across segments two
through four, thereby expanding their market. The
intention was to insulate the company from volatile
revenue streams. Their choice was also consistent
with NorthCo's strategy of establishing a supply
chain in China and implementing a cost leadership
strategy.
At the end of 2006, the long-term strategy for
NorthCo was to "continue to focus on being these
innovative guys that bring the next big products to
market" (CEO). An entrepreneurial strategy was
consistent with the companies' founding culture,
values, and sense of identity. The TMT was also
considering entering into segment one, the acces-
sories after-market, which, it was felt, would gen-
erate innovation, allow them to take products to
market faster, and also be a more forgiving segment.
They believed that they had moved down the out-
sourcing and off-shoring learning curve and would
continue to focus on continuously looking globally
for the next low-cost outsourcing option. For the
present, they continued their investments in their
outsourcing strategy in China, where they were
generating competition by partnering with multiple
suppliers and developing strong relationships, thus
reducing the risk of overreliance on one major sup-
plier and keeping their costs competitive. They
continued to avoid developing business interests in
the high-volume, low-margin, production line
manufacturing in segment five. The move into
China was proving to be a shrewd choice that was
giving NorthCo a cost competitive advantage over
their on-shore rivals, as financial data for increas-
ing numbers of companies for sale revealed.
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Changes in OEM Procurement Strategy Result in
Chance Losses for NorthCo
NorthCo's VP finance and president anticipated
returning to profitability in 2006, but unanticipated
events conspired against expectations. NorthCo
had won two large contracts for painted ground-
effects accessories from GM and Chrysler worth
approximately $40 million and $10 million, respec-
tively. Yet, in the end, they generated less than
$4 million in revenues in total. GM changed their
procurement strategy suddenly, allowing their
dealerships to buy these accessories as optional
rather than having them preinstalled, thereby re-
ducing the anticipated sale of products. Mean-
while, Chrysler ran into internal political debates
about quality control and durability testing pro-
cesses instigated by their merger with Daimler, re-
sulting in the launch of a very lucrative off-line
program being delayed. NorthCo required a lead
time of three years to cultivate and develop pro-
grams. When programs weren't as lucrative as fore-
casted, it took another two years to enact a recovery
plan, which impacted company revenues. NorthCo
lost approximately $1.6 million in 2005. An unin-
tended consequence of their move into China was
that without the cost advantage of their China
sourcing strategy, these losses would have in-
creased by $5 million to $6.6 million, the VP fi-
nance estimated.
Changes in Demand for SUVs Lead to New
Choices for NorthCo
In 2006-07, the automotive industry was still
selling as many cars as normal (approximately 16
million). However, the supply base in North Amer-
ica was becoming increasingly unhealthy owing to
overcapacity and intense competitive rivalry
among the OEMs. GM in particular was aggres-
sively driving down prices with their suppliers to
improve their own competitive position. This
meant that several of NorthCo's competitors had
either gone bankrupt, exited the industry, or gone
up for sale. The Canadian currency was also begin-
ning to appreciate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, which
could hurt the company's competitive position, but
the VP finance dismissed this changing circum-
stance: "It doesn't bother me. Everyone's in the
same position. . . . We've reduced our exposure by
invoicing in Canadian dollars."
By 2006, NorthCo had lost most of its declining
SUV business to a rival; this loss led to redundan-
cies on the manufacturing side of the business but
left design and engineering departments un-
touched. Most of NorthCo's recent growth had
come from the SUV market, but the internal Toyota
and GM data, which the CEO of NorthCo was privy
to, suggested that the pickup market would con-
tinue to stay stable in North America and have
growth prospects globally: "It's actually very stable
on the pickup side of the market. I get to see all the
internal stuff from Toyota and GM, all their market
research and that's basically what they're saying,
where they see the market going and everybody's
saying that the pickup market will be staying level"
(CEO). In addition, the emergence of more fuel
efficient vehicles presented new opportunities.
Toyota was developing a hybrid Tundra version,
and trends suggested that younger generations were
opting for smaller vehicles that they would custom-
ize through accessories and painted plastic prod-
ucts, NorthCo also picked up a program of doing
painted ground effects work for the Hjoindai Ac-
cent. Table 1 presents a 2004-08 time line, sum-
marizing the multiplicity of choices, chance events,
and unowned processes emanating from the indus-
try and manifesting in unintended consequences
for NorthCo.
Unintended Consequences of Choices about
Liquidity Lead to Chance Losses for NorthCo
By the end of 2006, the accumulation of disrup-
tions in their North American supply chain, inter-
nal politics at Daimler-Chrysler, GM's change in
procurement strategy, and changes in demand for
SUVs was taking its toll, resulting in declining fi-
nancial performance at NorthCo with cascading ef-
fects. The company's Canadian bankers decided to
intervene by restricting credit and demanding that
NorthCo's TMT take corrective action to improve
its financial situation. NorthCo had a $1 million
hedge against the price of nickel. As most of its
products used chrome, nickel was central to their
manufacture, but the return on the hedge invest-
ment had been poor. Because of the intervention by
their bankers, the TMT decided to inject liquidity
into the business by liquidating their nickel hedge.
Within the week, the price of nickel doubled, cost-
ing NorthCo $800,000 in 2006, and the price con-
tinued to appreciate steeply throughout the dura-
tion of the study.
Their deliberate decision to liquidate their nickel
position ended up costing them much more than
they had imagined; it is a classic instance of an
unintended consequence of strategic choice. From
2007 through 2008, nickel continued to appreciate
in price, running costs up in tbe millions of dollars
and forcing NorthCo to cope by changing the grade
of steel being used, thereby reducing the amount of
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TABLE 1
Choice, Chance, and Unintended Consequences of Industry-Level Change Processes
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in its virtual model.
Identity at NortbCo begins
to sbift from tbat of
design company back to
tbat of manufacturing
company.
"We're at a cross-roads—the
future could be good or
bleak. On tbe good side,
wherever industries are in
flux there are opportimities
to take tbe rigbt path. So on
tbe positive side we have
China and our production
strategy." (president)
"If I'd had my head up more,
if rd gone over on that
China trip tbree years before
I did we would've done tbat
Cbina deal three years
earlier. We would have
expedited tbe whole process,
tbe emerging pressures on
tbe business by doing tbat,
and I gotta tell you I tbink
it's gonna come anyway. . . .
It's interesting—you don't
really know till you've got
into it, but tbe differential
was so big costwise." (CEO)
"Step-assists bave been around
forever at about tbe same
kind of rate . . . wbat drove
our growtb before was SUVs,
but we've lost most of
tbat. . . . Everyone's saying
tbe pickup market vnll be
staying level . . . you're
going to see so many fuel-
efficient options
coming. . . . " (CEO)
"Higb volume, low complexity
fit in tbat segment five
category tbat in previous
years we'd never bave done.
Good margins, we'd secin-ed
that program." (VP
operations)
nickel used in their chrome products, and by en-
tering a joint venture with Du Pont and a Canadian
university to develop and commercialize a nano-
technology that would equip plastics with metallic
properties, potentially replacing the steel content
in their products in the future. "It's been one thing
after another. It's been a tough year" (VP finance).
Changes in Credit Markets Lead to Choices ahout
Financing
NorthCo's declining financial performance in
2006 and 2007 led to refinancing difficulties:
"We're definitely in survival mode at the moment,
dealing with the banks and renegotiating our fi-
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nancing, looking at new financing, so that's con-
suming a lot of our time at the moment" (VP fi-
nance). Banks perceived that there was overcapacity
in the automotive supply industry, cind concerns
over GM and Chrysler's deteriorating fortunes, in
particular, led to them restricting their financing
for automotive companies. NorthCo's China-manu-
factured products had to be insured as they were
shipped in containers across the ocean. Also, the
company needed an extension of credit for the
goods being shipped from Shanghai to warehouses
in Los Angeles, and this was provided, after an
exhaustive search of some 60 financial institutions,
by an American finance firm.
Further complicating the situation was a rapid
loss of market share by Chrysler, Ford, and GM to
foreign-owned auto companies such as Honda,
Hjamdai, and Toyota. To combat declining market
share, the "Detroit three" had been leveraging
global outsourcing to force existing suppliers to cut
their prices. As bankruptcies among suppliers
mounted, an unintended consequence of the De-
troit three's strategies was that credit markets con-
tracted, further compounding the problem. Caught
up in this process, NorthCo's bank sent word to the
CEO at NorthCo indicating a desire to terminate
their financing arrangements by November 2006.
They had lost confidence that the company could
hit financial targets and continue to survive. The
bank's loss of confidence in NorthCo led to the
president resigning and the CEO assuming control
of the day-to-day running of the company. With the
launch of delayed programs in December 2006,
however, the company was beginning to return to
profitability, and this helped persuade the compa-
ny's bankers that it could indeed be turned around.
A deal was negotiated with the company's bank
that would bring financing in from another finan-
cial institution. At the 11th hour, one person on the
bank's investment committee vetoed the deal, set-
ting off a whole chain of events. The bank sent in
consultants to assess NorthCo's viability. Even
though NorthCo were down by six million dollars
on their securities, the banks' consultants were ad-
vising the bank to give the company more time. The
CEO and the VP finance assumed that was what
was going to happen, but on one Friday in Feb-
ruary 2007 the bank called the CEO and informed
him that they would be in on Monday to shut the
business down. Over the weekend, the CEO
worked his contacts and found a private investor
who was prepared to make a financial injection
into the company. On the Monday morning, the
CEO and the company's lawyers met with a bank
official and the bank's lawyers. The bank's law-
yers had a letter that, once opened, would put the
company into receivership. The CEO presented
the bank with an alternative plan including fresh
injection of capital without extending their exist-
ing debt with the bank, and after a series of phone
calls to the bank's head office, the new deal was
agreed on.
Unintended Consequences of Choices Made over
NorthCo's Financing
The following day, a manager from procurement
at Toyota phoned NorthCo to tell them that they
had won large programs to produce grill guards for
Toyota's new generation Tundra. Also, General
Motors informed NorthGo soon after that it wanted
to promote several other NorthCo programs, taking
the company from $60 million to $75 million in
sales. But the problem that NorthCo now faced was
that the credit arrangements struck with their bank
left them bereft of extra capital to take advantage of
new sales and grow the business. The very actions
they took to save the company from liquidation tied
them to an agreement that prevented them from
capitalizing on the new orders from Toyota and
GM. Such was the irony of the situation they found
themselves in. In the short term, to capitalize on
these opportunities and increase revenues substan-
tially, more credit was needed. Negative attention
in the media to the automotive industry and the
credit markets' hostile disposition toward automo-
tive companies left NorthCo's TMT in a dilemma.
On the one hand, their strategy was beginning to
pay dividends, yet now they lacked the credit to
pursue these opportunities vigorously. On the
other hand, if they didn't keep up with increasing
orders from automotive companies, they'd soon
lose the confidence and trust of their customers in
their ability to deliver. This dilemma was an unin-
tended consequence of their negotiated deal with
the banks. As the newly promoted VP operations
explained:
It's terribly constraining just trying to rim tbe busi-
ness. . . . It's just been one obstacle after anotber and
still trying to keep swimming along. . . . Frustration
levels are extremely high because now we actually
are in a situation wbere we're starting to see some
sales recovery and we can't fund it. We're frus-
trated by tbe fact tbat we just cannot get tbe op-
erating casb to fund tbe supply base and get ma-
terial flowing again.
Changes in Demand Lead to Unintended
Consequences of Past Choices over Positioning
By March 2008, a structural shift in demand in
the North American automotive industry began.
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Approximately 30 percent of the people who used
to buy trucks began buying cars. Over a four-month
period, one-third of NorthCo's traditional market
segment disappeared. This was on top of a 2 per-
cent overall decline in automotive sales. There
were two perceived drivers of this shift. The first
was the increasing price of petrol. The second, and
perhaps more profound driver, was an emerging
social trend: environmentalism had finally taken
hold of American consumers.
Members of the NorthCo TMT, led by the CEO
and VP finance, were coming to the realization that
their current deteriorating economic conditions
differed from past experience: "This is a deeper
trough than we've been in previously, it's always
been a volatile up and down business, I think the
difference is that in the valleys before we've always
tried to hold on to resources and not cut costs as
quickly as our revenue is going down and we'd
need those good resources" (VP finance). With a
sudden structural shift in demand in the automo-
tive sector, NorthCo was left with high operating
costs, low margins, and low volumes on programs
for vehicles such as the Dodge Ram that had been
high margin and high volume for years. In addition,
NorthCo had programs with 10-15 year service
agreements with their customers. With OEMs cut-
ting back, the profit profile in the industry chang-
ing dramatically and, complexity in the organiza-
tion still high, NorthCo was saddled with the
unintended consequences of past choices in a con-
text of significant industry change.
Unintended Consequences of Choices over
NorthCo's Manufacturing Strategy
To keep the Canadian bankers financing NorthCo
in covenant, the TMT moved quickly to downsize
once again. As the VP operations reflected, "All of
a sudden the business had to dramatically change
the way it'd been operating all these years, which is
pretty hard to do, to reduce your overhead, because
you continue to have that thought that perhaps the
large sucking sound will somehow suck in more
business to support the overhead that you have."
Although their outsourced supply chain continued
to give them a cost advantage, this lock-in arrange-
ment also made it more difficult for NorthCo to
move into new products. Their decision to pursue
an innovation strategy reliant on a virtual model
was trapping them in now-volatile industry seg-
ments, as the dynamics of unowned change pro-
cesses subjugated deliberate choices taken in re-
sponse to seemingly chance events. As a final resort,
NorthCo's TMT changed their strategy to include seg-
ment five and began getting "bloody minded" (CEO)
about winning high-volume contracts.
Chance Political Events Further Erode NorthCo's
Financial Performance
The number of bankruptcies in the automotive
industry was increasing rapidly in 2007. What dif-
ferentiated NorthCo from other companies was its
lower cost structure driven by the virtual model
and outsourced operations in China. Despite their
setbacks, cautious optimism about the future was
expressed:
It's heen a tough year, we're still around though, a
lot of oiu' competitors are gone, which is nice, hut
we're showing great numhers for next year again and
we've transitioned out of the GM husiness, got a lot
of Toyota husiness, which is great. (CEO)
Further brightening the company's prospects
were unintended consequences of NorthCo's adap-
tive choices about manufacturing and market posi-
tioning strategy. The selecting-out of several com-
petitors because of higher cost structures created
more market space. Daimler-Chrysler was also re-
solving internal disagreements over procurement of
off-line programs and realizing that its new pro-
curement strategy was not nearly as lucrative; and
GM was returning to its previous procurement
model, which benefited NorthCo. NorthCo had also
been winning more contracts with Toyota and
Hjaindai, allowing NorthCo to transition out of
business with GM, which was assumed to be less
stable. As the VP finance remarked:
In the immediate future we're seeing some of the
customer issues resolve themselves at the customer
level. So Chrysler's turning offline hack on, GM's
switching back to their old [procurement] model,
the H3rundai husiness is launching so some of those
things are just working themselves through. We're
dealing with the commodity issue, heyond that we
really need to circle hack.
Before long, however, NorthCo ran into more bad
luck. A program had been won to produce grill
guards for Toyota's FJ Cruiser, which was selling
well. Three weeks before the launch of the pro-
gram, Toyota informed NorthCo that they would
not be able to launch because of a political trade
dispute between the United States and Japan and
legal issues concerning air bags. The launch was
supposed to go ahead in April, and the program
was projected to be very lucrative. As a conse-
quence, the program launch was delayed until De-
cember, further diminishing financial performance.
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Changes in Macroeconomic Exchange Rates Lead
to Forced Restructuring for NorthCo
The rising price of nickel paralleled a steep ap-
preciation in Canadian currency, which had tran-
sitioned from a largely latent concern into a major
challenge for NorthCo's competitiveness. NorthCo
had enjoyed a favorable exchange rate with the
United States for more than three years, with the
Canadian dollar (CD) remaining relatively stable at
65 cents to the American dollar (USD) between
1999 and mid 2003. By January 2004, the exchange
rate had appreciated to nearly 0.77 USD, and it
continued its volatile appreciation through 2005
and 2006. On September 20, 2007, the CD reached
parity with the USD, eventually reaching a high of
1.07 USD on November 7, 2007, before depreciating
back to 0.81 USD by the end of 2008. The currency
fluctuations between 2004 and 2009 had unexpect-
edly resulted in erosion of an important source of
competitive advantage and by 2008 were having a
detrimental impact on NorthCo's bottom line. This
confluence of unowned processes resulting in
chance events and unintended consequences of
past choices led to a further downsizing of
NorthCo's workforce while, in the words of the
newly promoted VP Operations, "maintaining the
organization on the promise of the future [condi-
tions improving]." This meant that costly design
and engineering departments continued to be
maintained.
Chance Financial Crises Leads to Strategic Change
The hostility of the credit markets toward the au-
tomotive industry was compounded with the engulf-
ment of the world in the 2008-09 global financial
crises. Vehicle sales fell by an additional 25-30 per-
cent over expectations. The net effect for NorthCo
was that its banks further reduced its credit by $3 mil-
lion dollars, thereby delaying payments to NorthCo's
suppliers. Between November 2008 and January
2009, NorthCo negotiated with Chrysler and GM to be
paid much more quickly than normal to help with the
cash flow problem. NorthCo had recently won a pro-
gram on GM's Cámaro, and, in a change in strategy,
they also secured a segment five program to produce
wheel-well liners for the Dodge Ram pickup. The
wheel-well liners were to come to one of NorthCo's
plants, where insulation clips would be installed, and
then shipped out in bulk: "High volume, low com-
plexity, fit in that segment five category that in pre-
vious years we'd never have done, good margin, we'd
secured that program" (VP operations). This freed up
cash to pay NorthCo's suppliers, who were also strug-
gling to stay solvent.
Choices about Financing Trap NorthCo in
Unowned Processes of Change
A final event surprised NorthCo when their
American bankers decided to withdraw credit for
any products being shipped across an ocean.
NorthCo's receivables were being insured by Ex-
port Development Canada, a facility that had been
put in place to help cope with volatility in the
credit markets caused by the 2008-09 financial
crises. In their search to find creditors for their
goods being shipped from Shanghai, NorthCo had
switched fi'om Canadian to American bankers.
Their American bank, as chance would have it,
wasn't familiar with the Canadian government and
didn't trust the company's insurance cover. This
credit withdrawal and the fact that 50 percent of
NorthCo's revenues now came from outsourced op-
erations in China left the company without the cash
to pay suppliers and hold inventory in its ware-
houses in California, where their products were
imported from China. As the CEO quipped, "Re-
member, cash is king." Table 2 presents a 2004-08
time line summarizing the multiplicity of choices,
chance events, and unowned processes emanating
from commodity markets, credit markets, and macro-
economic flux and manifesting in unintended conse-
quences for NorthCo.
NorthCo was already in a very tight situation. Up
until the end of 2008, creditors considered inven-
tory to be an asset. Finished goods and inventory
were valued more highly than raw material. Be-
cause NorthCo had suppliers in China, however, its
finished goods inventory spent three plus weeks in
transit before it could be sold. This resulted in a gap
between when cash was needed to buy the inven-
tory and when the company could sell it to generate
revenues. Initially, NorthCo's lender recognized
that the inventory was finished goods and ad-
vanced cash availability against it, even though it
was in transit on the water. However, their Ameri-
can banker suffered an on-the-water loss of inven-
tory with another client, and that client's insur-
ance company refused to pay out, resulting in a
loss to the bank. Consequently, the American
banker suddenly changed corporate policy and
stopped providing credit for on-the-water inven-
tory. This posed a major problem, as NorthCo
needed this credit to pay their suppliers. The
withdrawal of coverage for on-the-water inven-
tory and the refusal to provide capital against that
asset left NorthCo crippled. This set off another
cavalcade of events. Because they did not have
available cash, they didn't have enough in their
operating line to be able to cover inventory, a
typical cash flow problem. The VP operations
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willing to credit goods
being shipped overseas
as assets.
"Competition in tubes in particular is
cut-throat. Our strategy is to go low
cost. We're poaching, I sent a letter to
CM telling them we can produce tubes
for $20 cheaper—50,000
units—million dollar saving for them,
GM is the only one that will do this."
(president)
"But it's just a precarious time wbere, on
one band, its great that tbe business is
finally growing and tbat it's all turning
out the way we planned, just very
delayed, we're starting to make money
etc, but on the fiipside, tbe credit
markets axe still in a tizzy and it's just
been consuming—to be bonest witb
you—to try and just get a deal done
and to figure out wbere we're going to
go," (CEO)
"We can win as mucb business as we
want, but we don't bave tbe banking
support. But tbankfully, tbe future
looks bright," (CEO)
"Tbis is a deeper trough tban we've been
in previously. It's always been an up-
and-down business, I tbink tbe
difference is in tbe valleys; before,
we've always tried to bold on to
resources and not cut costs as quickly
as ovir revenue was going down,
because we'd need tbose resources, I
tbink tbis time we've been more
aggressive, we've reduced beadcount
more tban we bave in tbe past," (VP
finance)
Stated, "We just couldn't support it. So we started
to have this whole domino effect, we couldn't
pay the money to suppliers so the suppliers
stopped delivering . . . we went into backorder.
GM said we were in default of contract. They
cancelled all of our open contracts."
Choices Overwhelmed by Unowned Processes
Relentless industry and macroeconomic change
resulted in the TMT initiating a more fundamental
rethinking of the business. They dubbed the pro-
cess "wrestling with alligators" (VP operations),
which reflected the difficulties in coping strategi-
cally with primordial unowned forces beyond their
control. They began working on a service concept
wberein NorthCo would use its strong relation-
ships with OEM customers and hard-won expertise
managing global supply chains on a consultancy
basis, but the accumulation of unintended conse-
quences resulting from past choices interacting
with chance events and unowned processes left
NortbCo in a precarious position. Toward the end
of 2008, monthly sales declined for NorthCo until
tbey hit an all-time low of $2.2 million in January-
February 2009. Sales had fallen well below the
overall decline in automotive sales. This was due to
OEMs running down their inventory before placing
orders to cope with their own crises. OEMs' hold-
ing NorthCo inventory amplified the effects on
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NorthCo's demand curve. By April 2009, the OEMs
had used up much of that inventory, and NorthCo
was experiencing a spike in sales of more than
$4 million for the month, higher than the wider
industry recovery in automotive sales generally.
With high volumes of orders coming in, NorthCo
would have returned to profitability, but without
the credit facilities to get their supply chain mov-
ing, the TMT once again foimd themselves in the
position of being unable to finance the new growth.
Table 3 summarizes this multiplicity of choices,
chance events, and unowned processes resulting in
unintended consequences, the culmination of
which in 2008-09 overwhelmed managerial inten-
tion at NorthCo.
On Aprfl 30, 2009, Chrysler filed for chapter 11
bankruptcy protection in the United States. The
NorthCo TMT began implementing contingency
plans, including winding down the company, sell-
ing to a competitor, or refinancing through a Cana-
dian investment bank that they'd been in talks
with. As a consequence, they began looking at how
they were going to restructure and reduce costs
further. On Monday June 1, 2009, GM filed for
bankruptcy. On Wednesday June 3, 2009, Chrysler
gave NorthCo notice that it would be canceling its
contracts. The following day, Thursday June 4,
2009, GM canceled all of its contracts. Within
48 hours, NorthCo had lost two of its major custom-
ers, taking its annual sales down to $20 million: "It
was just getting silly at that point, we were like
'OK, we're done, we just can't make it'" (VP oper-
ations). After 40 years of business, NorthCo Auto-
motive was overwhelmed by a tsunami of events
manifest in processes ranging from the trappings of
their own strategic decisions to changes in compet-
itor strategies, currency appreciations, commodity
appreciations, credit market volatility, demand
shifts, credit crises, and finally, the bankruptcy of
two major customers. NorthCo filed for banlo-uptcy
on Friday June 5, 2009.
DISCUSSION
We began by asking how chance, relentless
change, environmental circumstances, and unin-
tended consequences can collude to shape organi-
zational destinies, despite the very best managerial
intentions and decisions. Our pm-pose has been to
progress a perspective on strategic change that
takes into account the presence of unowned pro-
cesses that can undermine intended organizational
outcomes. This approach steers a middle path be-
tween exaggerating the efficacy of agency and
choice and/or the debilitating consequences of
overpowering environmental forces by showing
how choice, chance events, and industry and global
changes interact to produce unintended conse-
quences that can play a decisive role in the success
or failure of organizations.
The analysis presented above suggests that nei-
ther strategic choice nor population ecology expla-
nations are able to fully account for NorthCo's
eventual failure. Instead, creative evolutionary pro-
cesses in which managerial choices are made in the
context of "one great blooming, buzzing, confu-
sion" (James, 1911/1996: 50) better characterize
NorthCo's predicament and eventual demise.
NorthCo's strategic choices at each point in the
saga, bom of an "imperious immediacy of interest"
(Merton, 1936: 901), contained the seeds of the
company's own downfall, as it eventually became
TABLE 3
When Chance Events and Unowned Processes of Change Overwhelm Managerial Choice
Choice Chance
Time (Decisions and Actions) (Black Swans)
Unintended Consequences
(Processes) Exemplar Quotes
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OEMs run down inventories.
"So witbin 48 bours, Cbrysler pulled
tbeir business and GM canceled all
tbeir contracts—Wednesday and
Tbursday. By Friday, we were on
tbe pbone witb tbe lawyer and
saying we were done. Without all
tbe GM business, and witbout
Chrysler, we were down to about
20 million or something, it was
just getting silly at tbat point; we
were like, 'OK, we're done, we just
can't make it."' (VP operations)
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overwhelmed by the unintended consequences of
its TMT's very own strategic actions. For instance,
despite setbacks with their on-shore manufacturing
supply chain in 2004-05, NorthCo's TMT mem-
bers' decision to rely on outsourcing to China
rather than vertically integrate turned out much
better than expected, with the unintended conse-
quence of enabling the company to survive for
quite some time throughout the tumultuous period
under study. Yet, paradoxically, it also resulted in
another unintended consequence: preventing
NorthCo from being able to switch into new prod-
ucts easily. The company's virtual model trapped it
in the accessories market, which became more vol-
atile as situations evolved. Under difficult operat-
ing conditions toward the end of 2006 and at the
beginning of 2007, NorthCo's TMT made an agree-
ment with their bank to restrict credit facilities,
which allowed them to continue to trade but also
left them unable to capitalize on opportunities of-
fered by the contracts that they had won from GM
and Toyota. Ironically, their business outlook
looked bright, but their inability to make the most
of the situations because of the unintended conse-
quences of their agreement to restrict credit con-
tributed to their eventual downfall. It also became a
major setback when their American creditors
changed their policy for on-the-water goods,
thereby precipitating a major cash flow problem.
This predicament was also partly a result of the
decision to switch from a Canadian to an American
banker because it was more expeditious at that
point in time. Had NorthCo persisted and found a
Canadian creditor, the Canadian government
would have extended guarantees to their Canadian
banks, giving NorthCo the cash to continue opera-
tions and trading.
Compounding circumstances were the severe fi-
nancial crises in 2008-09, which resulted in the
not wholly unexpected bankruptcies of Chrysler
and GM that left NorthGo in a particularly vulner-
able position. This period also saw Toyota in dis-
array, as that company experienced its first losses.
Similarly, NorthGo's decision not to pursue seg-
ment five initially trapped the company in a market
niche that was reliant on the receding SUV market
and the presumed stable truck market, which dis-
appeared almost overnight as petrol prices spiked
and environmental consciousness set in with the
American consumer. Clearly NorthCo had the ca-
pabilities and systems to produce for segment five,
and though the margins were lower, the business
would have been more reliable. Moreover, as credit
markets were becoming more difficult, NorthCo's
TMT's seemingly innocuous decision to liquidate
their hedge on nickel trapped them in a sudden
spiral of increasing commodity costs.
As Figure 1 suggests, wave after wave of change
manifest in complexes of unowned processes inter-
acting d5aiamically (illustrated in the figure in pro-
cess complexes one through four, representing con-
fluences of occurrences) overwhelmed managerial
choices and intentions (fashioned in response to
changing circumstances but resulting in unin-
tended consequences, illustrated diagrammatically
by the arrows around the choices in Figure 1),
FIGURE 1
Choice Overwhelmed by Chance Events and Unintended Consequences Produced hy Waves of Unowned
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leaving the NorthCo TMT to struggle and cope with
their emerging and largely unintended future.
In the final analysis, NorthCo's demise was due
neither to unrealized intention nor to preexisting
external environmental forces. NorthCo had clearly
changed as it struggled to cope with rapidly and
relentlessly shifting circumstances. The company
went through three rounds of downsizing; its se-
nior executive was reduced from 12 to 4 members;
and its strategy went through three significant iter-
ations, including reducing the amount of products
made and taking products across segments, even-
tually bidding on programs in the segment five
category, and finally developing a supply chain
management service concept. Toward the end,
NorthCo's sense of identity even showed signs of
beginning to shift back to that of a manufacturing
company from that of a design and engineering
company as a result of emerging pressures from the
unowned processes identified above. But the real
irony is that NorthCo ceased trading despite having
considerable amounts of profitable business and an
above-industry-average recovery. It was the inci-
dentals, the accumulation of historical events, the
interlocking effects of prior decisions, and their
eventual unintended consequences that downed
NorthCo.
Scholars have speculated on why selection pro-
cesses may fail to explain survivals of weak organ-
izations or populations and failures of strong ones
under extant theory (Barnett, 1997; Barnett &
Burgelman, 1996; Barron, West, & Hannan, 1994;
Carroll & Harrison, 1994). Levinthal and Posen
(2007), for instance, postulated that selection is
intrinsically myopic and that organizational adap-
tation may limit the efficacy of population selec-
tion. Such explanations, whether from adaptation
or population ecology orientations, take an owned
approach rather than focusing on the processes
themselves and imply essential stabilities in either
organizational or environmental traits. We suggest
that such ex post facto justifications for inadequa-
cies in theory ignore the possibility that in a world
of constant change and flux, a new set of philo-
sophical assumptions may be needed to under-
stand processes of strategic change. What is being
offered here is an alternative unowned process
view that recognizes the importance of action, in-
teraction, spontaneous change, and their unin-
tended consequences. Although it could be argued
that our study succumbs to a "fallacy of the wrong
level," conflating organizational, industry, and
macroeconomic levels of analysis, our ontological
reversal collapses such synoptic arguments, imply-
ing that outcomes are a consequent of mutually
causal process complexes. "Choice" and "environ-
ment" are not separate from one another; instead,
the one constitutes the other to which a response is
subsequently made. Outcomes in themselves,
whether for an organization or for a population, are
thus only temporary stabilities located in hindsight
in a relentlessly changing reality.
The well-intentioned choices exercised at NorthCo
were overtaken by unintended consequences that re-
sulted from the dynamics of unowned process com-
plexes. The primary cause of its eventual undoing
was a preoccupation with choices made to resolve
immediate problems, precipitating the set of paradox-
ical situations the TMT subsequently found them-
selves in. Choices, as we intimated in our theoretical
development, entail an arbjírazy operafion of "cutting
off' (Whitehead, 1929: 58-59). Choosing is funda-
mentally an ontological act of selecfive attending-to
in order to remove "equivocality and thereby help to
configure a version of reality to which we then sub-
sequenfly respond" (Chia, 1994: 795). Choices, there-
fore, are not sfraighfforwardly made in response to an
existing environmental situafion. Rather, the environ-
ment "arises from a decision/or it" (Whitehead, 1929:
58; emphasis added). As a consequence, all choices
generate an excluded "surplus" or "remainder" (i.e.,
what is not attended to, suppressed, ignored, or rele-
gated in importance) that then serves as the origin of
unintended consequences that subsequently return to
haunt the choice made. Choices frigger unowned
change processes that then costructure the possibili-
ties and thus the outcomes for organizaüons. An un-
owned process perspective makes chance and unin-
tended consequences core to its logic because the
spontaneous emergence of situations generated
through the essenfially parfial acfions and interac-
tions of organizaüonal actors with their perceived
environment imply that the possibility of black swans
is ever present. The latter is, in reality, nothing more
than the cumulative unintended effect of decisions
previously made; it is the "remainder" generated
through the arbifrary making of an "incision" into the
flow of organizaüonal reality.
Such a shift toward an unowned view of process
raises questions about what criterion should be
used to analyze and judge the success or failure of
organizations. Strategic choice advocates, for in-
stance, might explain strategic change at NorthCo
in terms of a dominant coalition, and particularly
an ambitious CEO, favoring research and design
over manufacturing, which led to errors of judg-
ment in their search strategies, sequential goal
seeking and, despite well-structured strategic deci-
sion-making processes, the mental representations
of their environment that they constructed. Strate-
gic choice advocates might thus conclude that
these internal choice dynamics, although well in-
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tentioned, led to mistakes over financing, manufac-
turing, resource allocation, and positioning that ul-
timately led to the company's failure.
Population ecologists, by contrast, would accept
that the TMT at NorthCo made choices, but they
would point to other reasons for the eventual fail-
ure. For instance, the choice to pursue a virtual
versus a vertically integrated model reflected vari-
ation, but later, ecologists might argue, it led to
structural inertia. For NorthCo to have changed
strategy and vertically integrated successfully, its
TMT would have had to identify a competitor in
distress and bought its assets at, say, ten cents on
the dollar.
Investing in new assets would have required too
much cash and increased the company's cost struc-
ture. So, given that NorthCo had been pioneering
outsourcing and off-shoring in its automotive niche
since 2000, a certain amount of structural momen-
tum accumulated. Although evidence from pro-
spectuses of competitors that had been for sale
clearly showed NorthCo to have one of the lowest
manufacturing cost structures and highest profit-
ability levels in its sector, population ecologists
might also point out that the company's model
relied on debt financing, and given this depen-
dence on external financial resources, their increas-
ingly unattractive balance sheet exacerbated diffi-
culties in attracting financing in an already hostile
financial resource environment. They might also
point out that the companies within NorthCo's spe-
cies population that survived the financial crises
were those that were leaner and vertically inte-
grated, albeit less innovative. NorthCo's variation
was, therefore, not retained by the environment,
but selected out.
More thoughtful strategy process scholars would
acknowledge that both perspectives offer insight
into the reasons for NorthCo's failure, yet their own
emphasis on the state of things and how they
change (cf. Bergson, 1911; Whitehead, 1929) in
their explanatory framework continues to rely on
an owned view of process that essentially limits
their ability to explain fully the eventual demise of
NorthCo. An alternative way of conceptualizing the
processes of change at work in the NorthCo case is
to draw on the unowned tenets identified in our
theoretical development and to show how process
complexes of interlocking choices, chance, and en-
vironmental flux can conspire to produce the un-
intended consequences that NorthCo faced
throughout this unfortunate saga. First, both North-
Co's choices and industry environment were in a
constant state of change and fluidity. Decisions fu-
eled by the "imperious immediacy of interest"
(Merton, 1936: 901) were taken that inevitably led
to unintended consequences, but such conse-
quences are only explainable in hindsight. The
very outsourcing and offshoring strategy that left
NorthCo vulnerable when Chrysler and CM went
bankrupt may well have become the modus ope-
randi of the industry sector in the future. And al-
though NorthCo was carrying approximately five
million dollars too much debt, its above-industry-
average return to profitability and growth prospects
would have improved its debt ratios. Alternatively,
it may have encouraged NorthCo to seek a merger
with a segment five player, thereby injecting liquid-
ity and combining NorthCo's considerable design
and outsourcing capabilities with the high-volume-
manufacturing capabilities of a partner. When
change is constant, and stability only a set of sec-
ondary transient manifestations, uncertainty is in-
evitable, and unexpected outcomes are always pos-
sible. Second, in the NorthCo case, change was
rarely ever owned by either the TMT or by some
predetermined industry environment. The balance
between the two was constantly disturbed by the
choice-chance-environmental change interac-
tions; unowned processes created unexpected lock-
ins that, in turn, eventually led to the rise of
unintended consequences. Such unintended con-
sequences occur through a confluence of unowned
processes in process complexes that eschew a lin-
ear causal accounting. Third, with every change
that NorthCo made, latent possibilities existed, as
small adjustments and commitments had profound
and wide-ranging effects over the longer term.
When NorthCo ceased trading, it had already been
through a process of reducing complexity in the
business, and the leaner structure, cost-competitive
manufacturing strategy, and new segment five fo-
cus contained all kinds of unrealized potentialities.
Foiurth, throughout the NorthCo story, there was no
predetermined underlying order that produced sta-
ble choice sets. Order emerged spontaneously, as
with the brief period of strategic planning in 2004,
and evaporated just as quickly, in this case having
dire consequences for NorthCo. So although our
framework accommodates many of the insights that
come from both strategic choice and population
ecology perspectives, we argue that to understand
processes of change in management and organiza-
tion, particularly in nonlinear contexts, process
must be understood as the unowned primordial
driving force behind change, and things, events,
and stable states must be understood as simply
temporary manifestations of this ever-fluxing
milieu.
As Figure 2 illustrates, owned versus unowned
perspectives can be conceptualized in terms of
whether environment is viewed as largely a prede-
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FIGURE 2





























termined structure or as fluxing and whether
choices are viewed as primarily stable choice sets
deliberately taken in the sequential pursuit of
goals, or unstable choice sets taken while creatively
coping with change. In quadrant A, where environ-
ment is well-configured and choices are stable,
change is likely to be an orderly process of strategic
positioning driven by managerial intention. In
quadrant B, where environment is fluxing but
choice sets remain stable, strategic change is likely
to still rely on reactive responses of managers as
they seek to adapt to their environment. In quad-
rant C, where environment is persistent and un-
yielding, choices are limited and constrained, and
change is largely determined through environmen-
tal selection. In quadrant D, however, where the
environment is fluxing and strategic choices are
largely superfluous, in situ practical coping action
takes place; change is driven by choice-chance-
environmental interactions and instantiated by un-
intended consequences. We would argue that
NorthCo was always in quadrant D, but quadrants
A through C, and especially A and B, reflect the
various perspectives on how NorthCo managers
saw their own situations evolving. Had they from
the outset rooted their approach in an unowned
perspective—or in quadrant D—(as did General
Kutuzov in Tolstoy's War and Peace), they may
have placed less emphasis on the stabilities and
relationships they had come to be acquainted with
and more on peripheral events and analyzing non-
linearities. This may then have rendered more
thinkable the possible unintended consequences
arising from the choice-chance-environment pro-
cess complexes that are the sine qua non of a phil-
osophically infused perspective on process.
CONCLUSIONS
Our conclusion is that advocating an unowned pro-
cess analysis of change in organization and manage-
ment involves embracing and acknowledging reality
as indeed chaotic, complex, fluid, sometimes ran-
dom, frequently messy, and often surprising in its
emergence. Equally importantly, this implies that in
explanatory accovmts, the role of social enfifies,
whether they be agency and intention or envfron-
ment, must be moderated to take into consideration
extenuating cfrcumstances brought about by vm-
owned change processes that can play a vital role in
shaping organizational destinies.
Contributions to Theory
This study shares Langley et al.'s interest in "un-
derstanding process questions about how and why
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things emerge, develop, grow, or terminate over
time" (2009). Our first contribution to this emerg-
ing research milieu is to advance a philosophically
informed, unowned perspective on processes of
change that emphasizes process as a constantly
moving, frequently messy, rarely controllable, and
often unpredictable phenomenon. Such an ontolog-
ical reorientation leads to our second contribution,
which is moderating the primacy and causal effi-
cacy of social entities, be they actors, organizations,
or environments, by enhancing the importance of
chance, flux, and unintended consequences in
bringing about desirable or undesirable outcomes.
Although the literature has acknowledged the role
of chance and unintended consequences in strate-
gic change (e.g., Balogun & Johnson, 2005; Boisot &
McKelvey, 2010; Burgelman & Grove, 2007; De
Rond & Thietart, 2007; Dooley & Van de Ven, 1999;
McKinley & Scherer, 2000; Pettigrew, 1997; Plow-
man et al., 2007; Porter, 1991; Thietart & Forgues,
1995), that role nevertheless fades all too often into
the background in the academic accounting of pro-
cesses of change. Our third contribution to theory is
reframing the debate between strategic choice and
environmental determinism through an attempt to
contribute to a genuinely processual approach to
studies of change and management. We do this by
showing empirically how unowned processes can
interact in unpredictable ways, engulfing purpose-
ful action in novel process complexes.
Implications for Practice
Such a reframing of the debate between mana-
gerial choice and environmental determinism in
terms that reflect a processual philosophical ori-
entation also has implications for practice. An
unowned processual approach requires cultivat-
ing sensitivity to the periphery, where black
swans that broadside even the most well inten-
tioned managers often originate. Scenario think-
ing, unlike forecasting, for instance, entails the
generation of alternative plausible outcomes for
choices taken. Scenarios intimate the ever-
present possibility of otherness and alert organi-
zational actors of the possible unintended conse-
quences of decisions made to resolve immediate
concerns. They also serve as a counter to selec-
tive blindness in scanning the environment and
could have alerted NorthCo to the possibility of
wider global changes taking place, such as the
rising imbalance of savings between East and
West and the volatile currency exchange situa-
tions, as well as the problems facing the automo-
tive industry and their possibly wider ramifica-
tions for each of the strategic choices NorthCo's
TMT members were taking. Arguably, the TMT
might have also been alerted to the risks of over-
reliance on financial borrowing for expansion or
the burden of a sudden withdrawal of on-the-
water goods. We therefore suggest that cultivat-
ing an internalized agility and mindfulness in-
volving ongoing creative adaptation as a modus
operandi based on an "unowned" process orien-
tation is a more effective approach for dealing
with the unintended consequences of action in a
messy and constantly changing world. As Tolstoy
(1869/1993) so eloquently demonstrated in his
epic chronicling of Napoleon's war with Russia, a
"control" ontology in a fluxing world has great
propensity for leading to mistakes that can prove
fatal. This same error characterizes NorthCo
TMT's abiding illusion of their own ability to
unilaterally control their own organizational
destiny.
Limitations and Future Research
We acknowledge that studying a single case
within a specific set of circumstances may limit the
ability to generalize some of our findings. However,
what we believe to be transferable is our fundamen-
tal message, that an unowned process approach is a
more authentic way of understanding change as an
impersonal primordial driving force that often
overwhelms purposeful adaptive choices and nat-
ural environmental selection. Although actors act
as a way of realizing a plausible outcome, events
take on a life of their own. And so at NorthCo the
actors had little to do with the viability of the
business in the final reckoning. Environments,
though, are not a fixed mold. Actors reply to envi-
ronmental pressures, but their replies generate a
reaction, and so on ad infinitum. So it is an ongoing
interaction that in this case resulted in collapse.
That is why process complexes generate unex-
pected outcomes. In this sense, black swans are a
way of explaining why these interactions by actors
failed as the NorthCo TMT members were caught
up in an eventuality they did not expect. Even with
their best intentions, events overtook the choices of
the TMT at NorthCo as circumstemces over-
whelmed them. Moreover, such chaotic circum-
stances eschew a strictly linear historical accoimt-
ing. All kinds of possibilities were latent at every
moment, but decisions were taken that contained
both the seeds of the company's rejuvenation and
its entrapment in these decisions.
Such a perspective opens up new possibilities
for understanding process theories of change and
management. We would encourage further re-
search that explores the nuances of an unowned
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perspective at multiple levels of analysis and in
differently sized organizations embedded in in-
dustries whose competitive dynamics are of vary-
ing intensity. Exploring the emergence of change
from seemingly innocuous occurrences at the pe-
riphery of organization and/or environment and
their manifestation as major strategic consider-
ations, investigating various modes of develop-
ment in multicausal strategic change processes
and how they are dispositionally structured over
time, researching the interplay of old with new
processes in novel process complexes, and study-
ing the transition of subterranean micro pro-
cesses into instantiated coordinate macropro-
cesses in interconnected nonlinear systems, and
vice versa, are all examples of how an unowned
processual focus can deepen understanding into
the creative and innovative nature of a manifold
of human experiences.
Our study suggests that process studies of
change and management need to be reoriented.
An approach that subjugates agency to process
and casts choices, decisions, and actions as epi-
phenomenal suggests that success and failure can
thus be seen as incidentals. It equally downplays
the heroic role of agency and the inherent pessi-
mism of population ecology theories of organiza-
tional survival. It was a series of incremental
and unexpected accumulations of circumstance,
chance events, and unintended consequences
that in the end downed NorthCo. This, we argue,
is more typical of what actually happens in the
world of strategic change in organization and
management.
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